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Montenegro: Vassal or Sovereign?
Octavian Sofansky, Stephen R. Bowers, Stephanie E. Cameron, and Marion T. Doss, Jr.

Executive Summary
A move toward Montenegrin independence would cause Serbian public opinion to
focus inward and would likely be the first step in the process towards true democratic
evolution. Russia is not likely to support Montenegrin independence and Russia is
unlikely to take decisive action to save the Yugoslav Federation. The removal of
Slobodan Milosevic from power will have a modest impact on the prospects for
maintaining independence.

Serbia and Montenegro, with the help of Russian arms and through the Treaty of
Berlin, July 13, 1778, were recognized as independent from the Ottoman Empire. The
early 20 th century saw the Serbian government ignite the fuse that sparked the World War
II and its progeny, the fall of the great multinational empires, worldwide depression,
World War II, and the Cold War. From the carnage of the Great War, representatives of
Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, and Montenegro announced the creation of a new South Slav
confederation, Yugoslavia, under the ruling Serbian dynasty. The history of this
federation was troubled with the Serbs attempting to create a centralized Serb state and
the other nationalities resisting this effort in an attempt to maintain some degree of
autonomy.
The Post Cold War period has witnessed both globalization and a revival of
nationalism by oppressed peoples. The breakup of the Soviet Union and the
fragmentation of Yugoslavia are two of the more dramatic examples of these phenomena.
The policies of the Yugoslavian (Serbian) government under Slobodan Milosevic had
th
exacerbated and accelerated nationalistic tensions. The 20 century, which began with
such promise for Serbia, ended in failure and frustration. During the 1990s, Serbian
power has been serially excluded from Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia, Macedonia, and
Kosov o . All that is left outside Serbia proper is Voivodina and Montenegro.
If Montenegro goes the way of the other republics, the idea of Yugoslavia is
nonexistent. Serbia will lose access to the sea. Therefore, Serbian policy and the ability to
salvage something from the current series of debacles are important issues for the peace
and stability of the Balkans and Eastern Europe. The policy of the Russian Federation
towards Serbia and the Balkans, Montenegro in particular, is also extremely crucial. It is
the Russians who have shown an affinity to aid their South Slav cousins from the Tsarist
Empire to the Soviet Union.
The principal author looks at the Montenegrin question from an East-European
perspective in the wake of Western opposition to ethnic cleansing and other distasteful
practices, examining the ideas of Yugoslavian unity, the notion of a Greater Serbia, and
the possibility and implications of Montenegrin independence. Crucial to the outcome is
the extent to which Russia will come to the aid of Serbian policies and the post-Milosevic
stance of the West on Montenegrin secession.

STRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE OF MONTENEGRO
Montenegro has never before enjoyed the international importance it currently
commands. Until October 2000, the Montenegrin leadership was traveling to Western
capitals where it was assured of increased support. During this time, Western strategic
analysts focused their attention on Montenegro, and NATO officers fill their folders with
detailed maps and aerial photos of the region. There is a simple explanation for this
international prominence that this small region enjoys: Montenegro is the final element of
the Yugoslav federation outside of Serbia. Montenegrin independence would end the
dream of a nation of southern Slavs and, as some optimists predict, the beginning of a
democratic Serbia, an event which might bring a long awaited stability to the Balkans.
Prior to October 2000, a Western-oriented Montenegro would have firmly isolated Serbia
and Milosevic, making the economic blockade work and bring an end to the Milosevic
regime. It was predicted that the mountainous republic would have to pay too a high price
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for its independence, Strategists feared that "Montenegro will all too likely be the next
war in the series that have pockmarked the death of the fantasy of Greater Serbia", DO
Indeed, the little Adriatic country of 650,000 inhabitants and 13,812 square
kilometers, the size of United States' state Connecticut, with no important mineral
resources, and no strategic infrastructure has never before enjoyed such international
prominence, It has been an isolated borderland that even the Turks were unable to
control, paying little attention to the remote mountainous theocracy after the conquest of
Serbia in 1389, In 1918, after more then five centuries of semi-independence, Serbian
King Alexander Karadjordjevic, a son-in-law of Montenegrin King Nikola, backed by the
Treaty of Versailles, incorporating Montenegro into the newly established kingdom of
Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, treating the inhabitants of Montenegro as Serbs, During this
period, all symbols or reminders of Montenegrin sovereignty were suppressed, Even the
traditional Montenegrin hat, which, displayed the Cyrillic initials of King Nikola, was
banned and a new Serbian symbol was required to be worn atop formal hats,
In 1945, Tito granted federal status to allied Montenegro to increase the voting
power of Belgrade in the eight-man collective leadership of the newly established
Yugoslav federation, relying on Montenegrins as the most loyal allies of Serbia, In this
period, vestiges of the old monarchy were suppressed and Montenegrins seemed to
accept their place in the Yugoslav federation, Apparently loyal to the end, Montenegro
was the only part of Yugoslavia that voted in the 1992 referendum to stay in federation,
The symbolic role of Montenegro assumed great importance over the years, The
only Balkan military force not defeated by the Turks, it was seen by many as a beacon in
their fight for independence, The Russians regarded Montenegro as the first free Slavic
nation in the Balkans and their natural ally, while the Serbians saw Montenegro as the
beginning of the Serbian independence and the cornerstone of Greater Serbia, The rocky
highlands of Montenegro (Crna Gora), with their nucleus on the Zeta River, served as an
important refuge to Serbs fleeing from the advancing Turks in the fourteenth and
fifteenth centuries, Montenegro resisted as a semi-autonomous theocracy for three
centuries before becoming fully independent at the end of the eighteenth century,131
According to the 1991 census, the current inhabitants of Montenegro identify
themselves 62% as Montenegrins, 15% as Muslims, 9% as Serbs, 7% as Albanians, and
7% as others, While the majority of the popUlation belongs to the Orthodox Christian
tradition (Montenegrins and Serbs), there is also a large Muslim popUlation and smaller
numbers of Roman Catholics, This leads to significant support of a separate Montenegrin
nation, a separate state, and a separate church,
The geography of Montenegro is dominated by two high mountain ranges
spanning across the country, The Montenegrin seacoast is a narrow strip of land running
from Kotor Bay near Croatia to the Bojana River at the frontier with Albania, The high
Dinaric Mountains of O~jen, Lovcen and Rimija rise from the sea, forming a magnificent
background to the coastal strip but a great obstacle to communication between the coastal
and inland parts of Montenegro, The old capital of Montenegro, Cetinje, is hidden high
on the mountain of Lovcen, The Zeta plain bordering lake Skadar comprises the biggest
lowland region of Montenegro and the most fertile area, It is dominated by the economic
and political center of Montenegro, Podgorica (former Titograd), the country's capital,
130 SMITH Dan, "Integrating Serbia into the Balkan region", Security Dialog Vol 30(3), PRIO, SAGE
publications, 1999,
131 G,W. Hoffman: "The Balkalls in Transition", D. Van Nostrand Company. New Jersey, 1963, p.40,
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European and Euro-Atlantic integration, a path that guarantees a long-term stability and a
clear prospective of economic development. All of these countries, except Yugoslavia,
have in one form or another engaged in the integration process with the European Union
and NATO. The most advanced candidates, Slovenia, Romania and Bulgaria, have
opened negotiations for a full membership in the European Union. They are also the
forerunners for NATO membership. Countries like Albania, Macedonia and, since
recently, Croatia are members of the Partnership for Peace program sponsored by NATO.
Even Yugoslavia through its foreign minister has unveiled its strategic goal to become
part of the European Union. t35
What one observes in the Balkans today is a complex process of integration that
proceeds at various speeds. Throughout the region, both university scholars and
government officials speak of the urgency of creating a more effective regional
framework. Recognition of the need for a more concerted, balanced, regional approach in
cooperation was demonstrated by the creation of the Stability pact for South-eastern
Europe in 1999. The crucial significance of this agreement is that through its concluding
Cooperation and Association Agreements, it offers the prospect, though a remote one, of
membership in the European Union for all the countries in the region. Macedonia was
first to benefit from this status, and Croatia and Albania next to follow.
The notorious exception to this integration process is the politically and
economically isolated and authoritarian Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, within which
Montenegrins increasingly voice their dissatisfaction. Given its isolationist past and an
affinity to Serbia few can predict the future of Montenegro. Several options appear
plausible. The first envisions an independent Montenegro, coming out of a non-violent
divorce with Serbia, as one of prosperous Adriatic mini-states, living on tourism and
commerce from a larger Europe. The second scenario sees Montenegro as still a part of
Yugoslavia, providing a democratic leader, like Vojislav Kostunica remains in office, as
an equal part of a loose confederation. The third scenario predicts a violent break-up with
Serbia, transforming Montenegro into a NATO protectorate, similar to Kosovo or
Bosnia-Herzegovina, living on donations from the international community. The fourth
scenario predicts the resurrection of a federal Yugoslavia, in which, the central
government would exercise all significant powers under this scenario. Indeed, the crucial
question asked by international community and the Montenegrins themselves, is how to
avoid violence and to reach toward the European and world community at the same time.

Djukanovic, has emerged as a leader of the Montenegro drive for sovereignty against
Belgrade's autocratic rule.
Djukanovic, the president of Montenegro since the 1997 elections and a former
Prime Minister, is an apparatchik. However, since becoming president he sharply
criticized Milosevic for his confrontation with the West, and has enacted liberal reforms,
launching a program of privatization, introducing the Deutsche Mark as the second
cUITency in the country, and seeking cooperation with Montenegro's neighbors. During
the NATO bombing campaign in 1999, Djukanovic blamed Milosevic for provoking the
strikes but also called on NATO to stop the bombing. He repeatedly addressed the
Western countries and international financial institutions (IFIs) for aid and investment,
which was slow to come partly because of the blockade on Yugoslavia and partly because
of unclear status of relations between Montenegro and Serbia. Internationally, the
federation of Montenegro with Serbia was not recognized by the United States and many
others, Russia and Cuba were among the few exceptions. t36
The electoral block headed by Milo Djukanovic, "Da Zivimo Bolje," won the
1998 parliamentary elections with 49.54% of the votes over the pro-Serbian Serbian
National Party (SNP), which received 36.1 % of the vote. The three parties of the
coalition; Social Democrat Party (SDP) of Zarko Rackevic, the People's Party (NS) of
Dragan Soc and Djukanovic's Democratic Socialist Party (DPS), advanced a common
platform, where they called Belgrade to accept confederate relations, stopping short of
independence.
Until 2000, the idea of a referendum on independence became increasingly
attractive to many Montenegrins. Djukanovic used it as leverage against Milosevic in
order to obtain a "redefinition of relations with FRY", which in fact would mean the
maintenance of loose political affiliation with Belgrade and at the same time an
opportunity to enact independent economic policies and qualify for Western aid and
investment. Milosevic worked against this proposal by sponsoring pro-Serbian parties
and increasing the Yugoslav Army (VJ) presence in the region. The utility of the
Yugoslav Army, according to Belgrade professor Vojin Dimitrievic, is greatly enhanced
by the fact that it was the only federal institution that still functioned in this fractured
nation. 137
The Liberal Alliance (LSCG), the longest consistent supporter and most active
promoter of Montenegrin independence, has stayed aside from the governing coalition.
Its supporters argue that Montenegro, as an independent nation was abusively
incorporated into the Yugoslav Kingdom and the Montenegrin Autocephalous Church
was subordinated by force to the Serbian Orthodox Church in 1920. Surviving in exile,
for instance in Detroit, Michigan, USA, the Montenegrin Autocephalic Orthodox Church
was reactivated in Cetinje in 1993. In the same year Dr. Vojslav Nikcevic published a
book suggesting that "Montenegrins speak and write Montenegrin", different from
Croatian or Serbian.
Today the Montenegrin Diaspora, scattered around North America and Europe,
who held their Second World Congress in August 2000 in the old Montenegrin capital of
Cetinje under the patronage of President Milo Djukanovic, actively support
independence.

INTERNAL POLITICAL DUALISM
The double-headed Montenegrin eagle reflects perfectly the dilemma of the
country today. One head is looking to Brussels and the West and the other remains loyal
to Belgrade. Since the 1999 crisis in Kosovo, the Montenegrin polity is crystallizing
around the two options: independence or a continued federation. As in 19 I 8, when the
local assembly voted for unification with Serbia, the Montenegrin patriots, under the
green flag, confronted the Yugoslav patriots under the white. The Green Camp is
growing constantly. Traditionally supported by the nationalist wing, the Diaspora, and the
Montenegrin Autocephalous Orthodox Church, for the last two years it has attracted an
increasing number of moderate parties and voters. The incumbent president, Milo

135

VUKOVIC Borislav, "Yugoslavia and the European Union", Review of International An'airs, 1999,

1]6 The US view is that the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) has dissolved and that none of
the successor republics represents its continuation, Source: CIA Home Page,
137 Interview, Graz, July 1,2000.
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This pro-independence president can rely on his voters, the radical nationalists
from LSCG, the Democratic Party of Socialists, the Social Democratic Party, the support
of the Diaspora, the Montenegrin Autocephalous Church and the 20,000 strong
Montenegrin police. Many Albanians and Muslims antagonized by Milosevic's behavior
during the wars in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo also support Montenegrin
independence.
On the other side there are supporters of maintaining Montenegro as a part of
Yugoslavia. Milosevic, loyal Serbs and Montenegrins as well as the 10,000 strong
Yugoslav Army and 1,000 pro-Serb paramilitaries backed their former leader, Momir
Bulatovic, the former president of Montenegro. After Milosevic was voted out of office,
Momir Bulatovic also left his governmental position.
The Socialist People's Party of Montenegro (SNP) is the strongest single party in
the country. Momir Bulatovic established an electoral coalition known as "YugoslaviaSNP _ Momir Bulatovic." This coalition attempted to unite the pro-Yugoslav forces in
the republic and is specifically addressed to two small Serb-nationalist parties: Serb
Radical Party (SRS) and Serb People's Party (SNS). After the 2000 federal elections, the
SNS gained the parliamentary seats allocated to Montenegro. 138
After Milosevic was voted out of office the Democratic Opposition of Serbia
became increasingly popular. Today DOS and the SNP have formed an alliance fighting
for the formation of a united Yugoslavia.
Historically, besides Serbia, Yugoslavian patriotism has found a more fertile
ground in Montenegro, which saw itself as the beacon of the southern Slavic
independence. The Montenegrins were ferocious fighters in the World War II resistance
movement, they had a disproportionately high percentage of members in the Yugoslav
communist party, and they were always over-represented on the federal level. Many
Montenegrins will comment that they always went to Serbia to go to school and to
assume authority. In addition, there is a large population in Serbia of native
Montenegrins, while at the same time there is a large community of Serbs and Serb
refugees in Montenegro itself. Just several years ago Montenegrins fought along with
Serbs for Yugoslav unity in Dubrovnik.
In addition to ideology and politics, the economy plays an important role in the
development of this region. Montenegro, along with Macedonia and Kosovo, was one of
the poorest republics of Yugoslavia. However, it was the Yugoslav central planning that
allowed Montenegro to jump from a backward feudal society into industrialization and
urbanization. Montenegro also became a tourist paradise during the summer months.
Since the beginning of the recent crisis in Yugoslavia, the heavy industry has been in
economic distress. The only revenues are provided by Serbian tourists, and, increasingly,
by smuggling. Montenegrin government sources acknowledge that years of sanctions
have fueled the black economy and the smuggling of cigarettes into Rome, which is
costing Italy millions in tax revenues. 139 Indeed, many speedboats anchored in Kotor Bay
belong to veteran smugglers who earned their fortunes in the Bosnian Conflict when aliter of gasoline smuggled by Albanians over Skadar Lake could be sold to Bosnian Serbs
for a fivefold price.
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Table 1. Preferred Status of Montenegro
Federation Independence
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Confederation
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20.5 %

September
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19.6 %

January 2000.

28.0%

36.1 %

22.5 %

After the Spring 2000 elections, President Milo ~jukanov~c threat.ened to call a
referendum on the question of independence in the near future. DJl.lkanovlc declare~ o.n
the 4th of April 2000, "This spring or a bit later the referendum will happen. Serbia IS
sinking deeper and deeper, its debts are accumulating, it has imposed a blockade on
Montenegro, and is playing various tricks." 145 "A referendum offering a straight choice
between Yugoslavia and independence could probably be won now," exp~rts of t~e
International Crisis Group have stated. 146 The opinion polls show a constant 1I1crease 111
support for independence. In July 2000, surveys indicated that 39.7% of Montenegrins
· 147
were in favor of separation of Montenegro from Yugos IaVIa.
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On the other side, there were fears of a forced removal from offlce of
Montenegro's pro-independence president. Former US .Secretary o~·. State. M~deline
Albright repeatedly warned Milosevic "any change by torc~. of political situatIOn of
Montenegro will be sanctioned." NATO's European forn~er n~llitary l~ader ':".esley Cl~lrk
said at a news conference that Serbia is clearly prepanng for possible military acl10n
against pro-western Montenegro. Clark declined to comment on any military preparations
'1'
.
f
148
NATO may have made in this respect, but clearly warned MI osevlc not to mter ere.
Both officials and the average citizens expressed great concern about the role o~ a 1,O~O
member paramilitary force created by the Serbian governn;ent and statIOned 111
Montenegro. This development was an ominous accompaI11ment to the already
threatening role of the to,OOO soldiers of the Yugoslav Sec.ond Army that had ta~en over
Montenegrin airports and set up pro-Serbian television statlO~s on I~S Montenegnn bases.
Montenegrin officials complained, both in private as well. as 111 publtc, that th~ Serbs took
these actions in an effort to provoke President Djukanovlc mto overreact1l1g 111 a manner
that would bring about popular support in Serbia for a military.mov~ a~.ainst.Montenegro.
In the meantime Milosevic was attempting to exercise hiS f111al 1I1strument of
leverage against Montenegro. In July 2000, the federal ass~mbly,. disregarding the
opposition, passed amendments to the constitution of Yugoslavia,. pav1l1g the way for. a
new mandate to Milosevic. In response Filip Vujanovic, the Chairman of Montenegnn

Parliament, announced that the government coalition of Montenegro will boycott federal
elections in the fall saying, "Montenegro will not participate in any elections that would
mean the ruling of Siobodan Milosevic.,,149 On August 25, in an effort to limit local
participation in the elections, the Montenegrin government banned state media coverage
of the election campaign. This ban covered all of Montenegro's public television and
radio stations.
Western support for Djukanovic was partly predicated on the judgement that, in
the absence of credible opposition in Serbia, he constituted the only serious opposition to
Milosevic in the Yugoslav context aiming at making Djukanovic the figurehead for all
the opposition to Milosevic.1 5tJ However, in 1999, the Western powers urged Montenegro
not to try to secede from Yugoslavia but to join Serbian opposition to confront Milosevic
and work for democracy "from within.,,151 A new attempt to unite Serbian opposition
under one banner failed again in July 2000 in Svety-Stefan, a Montenegrin resort. In
speaking with Octavian Sofransky, many people from Podgorica, Belgrade, and Zagreb
expressed their conviction that Yugoslavia's enduring political crisis is beyond the
control of "democratic" forces. For these individuals, the only answer was one that would
come from within Milosevic's political entourage.
The UN High Commissioner for Refugees, Sadako Ogata, said she did not see
Montenegro becoming the next Balkan tlash point. However, the UNHCR was building
up emergency facilities in the region, though she was cautiously optimistic the tense
situation would not escalate to the extent of Kosovo in the late 1990s.1 52 The international
crisis group called for a slow internalization of Montenegro through infiltration of NGOs
as well as other initiatives. EU High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy,
Javier Solana, agreed that Montenegro should stay within the Yugoslav federation but
with closer contact with other nations in the region. IS}
The more radical members of this camp declared, "the Serb preparations for
violent intervention against Montenegro's President Milo Djukanovic are clear and
present, staying out of Montenegro will be impossible. Balkan stability and Yugoslavia's
existence are in a direct contradiction, three more viable states, independent Montenegro
and Kosovo, plus a democratic Serbia, may be the most stable outcome. The end of
Balkan instability requires far more than bombing from 15,000 feet and peaceenforcement. It may, ultimately, require military force to ensure the dismemberment of
Yugoslav remnants.,,154
The September 2000 elections brought about great changes in strategy for the
entire Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Vojislav Kostunica, the Western-preferred
presidential candidate, defeated Milosevic. After Milosevic left office the threat of
violence ceased and the international community exhaled. Soon, the West began to
expect Montenegrin anel FRY problems to dissipate, bettering relations and remaining a
confederation.
"The governing coalition will boycott federal elections", Pohjeda, Podgorica, July 23, 2000
GOW James, "Montenegro: Where to take the fight", Security Dialog Vol 30(3), PRIO, SAGE
pUhlications,1999.
151 Italy's Mafia obsession aids Miloscvic-Montenegro, Decemher 28, Brussels, (Reuters) by
montenegro.com.
152 UNHCR says Montenegro not next Balkan flashpoint, Tirana, March 26 (Reuters) by
IVww.montenegro.com
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147 "Za i protiv otcepljenja Crne Gore od Jugoslavije", Blic Montenegro, July 20, 2000
148 NATO sees threat to Montenegro, warns Serbia, Lisbon, posted on March 29 (Reuters) posted on
montenegro.com.

96

Montenegro: Vassal ur Sovereign

Issues of the Post-Communist Transition: Structure, Culture, and Justice

For the first time since 1998, Djukanovic attended a session of the Supreme
Defense Council on December 25, 2000. Since Milosevic was no longer in office, there
were many changes to the military stationed in Montenegro. The most important
development was the plan implemented in late March 2001 concerning the Second Army
from Montenegro. , General Milorad Obravdovic, the commander of the Second Army
was removed from his position. By mid-March, the Seventh Battalion was disband from
Montenegro and was redeployed to Southern Serbia. The presence of the Yugoslav
Almy remains in Montenegro although the VI's chief-of-staff, General Nebojsa asserted
"the anny will not interfere in Montenegro's decision over its future status.,,155
Today, the VJ is no longer regarded as a security threat to Montenegro, although,
its presence remains, showing Montenegro and the rest of the international community,
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Table 2. Preferred Status of Montenegro II 157
Federation

Independence

Confederation

April 2000.

25.3%

35.7%

19.8%

October 2000.

19.0%

36.8%

26.1%

January

16.1%

36.0%

33.7%

20001.
After the September presidential elections, the percentage of Montenegrin's who
wanted to remain in the federation decreased dramatically. The idea of a confederation
became more popular after Milosevic left office, thus demonstrating that many
Montenegrin's were not against the FRY but were against Milosevic. The increased
support of a confederation showed political duality within Montenegro. These statistics
from January ended up playing a vital role in the April 2001 elections.
The April parliamentary election results showed that the secessionist movement
had approximately 42% of the vote while, just over 40% voted for the opposition
party. t58 Although the results of this election were extremely close, Milo Djukanovic has
"pledged to push on with plans for holding a referendum on independence.,,159 In
Montenegro, referenda require the participation of 50% of all eligible voters to be valid.
Those who support the federation plan to boycott this election, making it virtually
impossible for independence to be achieved.
Anti-independence voters were strongly represented in this election giving FRY
President Kostunica and Pre drag Bulatovic, head of the Socialist People's Party, hope
that the Yugoslav federation would stay intact. On the other hand it gave Djukanovic's

VIP Daily News Report, 17 January 2001.
ICG Balkans Report 107,28 March 2001. 7 Posted May 24, 2001 by Iittp:llwww.crisisweb.org
157 Data from April 2000, October 2000, and March 2001 CEDEM polls.
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http://www.cnn.coml2001/WORLD/europeI04123/montcnegro.pol1.03/index.htmI23 April 200 I.
159 bttp://www.cnn.com1200J/WORLD/curopeI04/24/montcnegro.pol1.02!index.htmI24 April, 200 I.
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geographic unfeasibility of the project, Serbia being isolated from Russia by EU and
NATO candidates, the current union itself is hardly functioning economically or
politically. A 1999 Russian opinion poll revealed that only 28% of the public favors the
union while 69% are against it. 162 After observing the union, Moscow sees it as an
economic burden and a political embarrassment. This is primarily due to President
Lukashenko's notoriously undemocratic rule in Belarus. The rationale of union survival
lies in the geo-strategic realm, namely Moscow's fear of NATO reaching Russian
frontiers. Milosevic's appeal generated little support among the Kremlin leadership, thus
demonstrating the limited geo-strategic significance of Yugoslavia in Russia today.
Instead, Moscow's reaction to the Kosovo crises focused on a diplomatic effort to get a
stake in the post-conflict arrangement and on military maneuvering to test the cohesion of
NATO forces. In Moscow, anti-NATO campaigns found fertile ground among Russian
nationalists, but debates about the cost of peacekeeping efforts in the former Yugoslavia
indicated that other issues were influencing Russian politics. The former Yugoslav
ambassador to Moscow, Borislav Milosevic, acknowledged in an interview that the idea
of joining the Russia-Belarus Union had been discussed in Belgrade before the bombing,
and on March 24, 2000 the Yugoslav parliament requested observer status in the Union.
He did admit both; the Yugoslav opposition and Montenegro oppose the idea of the
union. i63 The appeal was followed by Milosevic' s petition to the presidents of Russia and
Belarus in which he declared, "Yugoslavia is ready to join the union." Milosevic argued
on the basis economic complementarities, "multiculturalism," and the Orthodox religion
commonality.
Yugoslavia as a whole might have supported Milosevic's move to an alliance with
Russia, but in Montenegro things are seen differently. A recent opinion poll shows that
only 16% of ethnic Montenegrins in the republic supported adherence to Russia-Belarus
Union compared to 53% of ethnic Serbs. The same source indicates that both Serbs
(65%) and Montenegrins (87%) support the eventual joining of Montenegro to the
European Union. i64
The idea of aligning with Russia is not new in Yugoslavia. Vojslav Sesel, the
leader of the Serbian Radical Party, suggested it in 1993. Although this idea faded away,
it was resurrected in 1999 under the imminence of NATO bombing. Russia and
Yugoslavia signed an agreement on military cooperation, but it was suspended because of
the UN embargo. Belgrade then made a new attempt to make Russia an ally.
This Yugoslav initiative was received with varied reactions from Russian
politicians. Constantin Zatulin, leader of the "Derzava" movement, suggested, Russia
should increase assistance to Yugoslavia. This assistance would be given through
deliveries of military equipment. Alexei Mitrofanov from the ultra-nationalist LDPR
(Zhirinovski's party) argued for the acceptance of Yugoslavia into the Union and bring
the country under the Russian nuclear umbrella. In Mitrofanov's opinion, this action
would guarantee the end of the conflict and resurrect the legendary Russian might. Elena
Zazulina from the reformist "Yabloko" block insisted that a union with Russia and
Bulgaria would only be considered only after the end of military conflict. Instead, she
suggested a referendum. 165
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Even with an ample anti-NATO campaign, Russian public opinion never favored
mi.ht.ary support for Yugos~avia. In October 1998, 44% of Russian respondents in an
0p11110n poll favored the action and 53%were against. Six months later in April 1999, at
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the height of NATO strikes, only 36% were in favor, with 61 % against. An even larger
percentage declared its readiness to go to fight as volunteers in Yugoslavia, but there has
been no confirmation of organized Russian military groups fighting on the Serbian
side. 172 Nor could any Russian volunteer face a NATO pilot flying at 30,000 feet.
Vasili Axenov, a well-known Russian intellectual, portrayed Russia as "One hand
protesting, stretched in a fist, the other begging the West with humiliation.,,173 He
condemned the ambitions of the Russian leadership and the "wave of hysterical antiAmericanism." Axenov called upon Russia to act as a mediator.
There is a long history of mediation in this region. Upon arriving in Belgrade on
March 30, 1999, Russian Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov, accompanied by Defense
Minister Sergheev and Foreign Minister Ivanov, proclaimed his intention to "attempt a
political solution ... by enabling Yugoslavia to defend its rights on the international
scene.,,174 Belarus President Lukashenko, in a visit following that of the Russian
delegation, voiced his support for the "Primakov's initiative." Over the next two weeks
the Russian ambassador in Belgrade, Yuri Kotov, arranged numerous visits by Russian
representatives including the President of the Russian Duma, Gennady Seleznyov and,
the Russian Patriarch Alexi n. He also presided over the repatriation of Russian
citizens,
175
On April
about one thousand, whom left Yugoslavia during the bombing campaign.
22, a new Russian mediator, Victor Chernomyrdin, arrived in Yugoslavia. Chernomyrdin,
a former Prime Minister as well as a special representative of President Yeltsin,
proclaimed that his mission was "to convince the United States and NATO to stop
bombing Yugoslavia, and ask Yugoslav leadership to soften its position and relaunch the
talks". 176
Russian diplomacy has neither succeeded in proposing effective solutions for the
crisis nor in securing a firm place for Russia in the post-connict arrangement. Moscow's
diplomats demanded a separate zone of control for Russian peacekeepers, but NATO,
fearing a de-facto partition of Kosovo much like the post-World War II partition of
Germany, refused to accept their claim. Feeling its honor at stake, the Russian military
command ordered its troops to occupy Pristina Airport, several hours before NATO,
using a part of its peacekeeping force stationed in Bosnia. This military-political triumph
was short lived, however, the Russian contingent in Kosovo was forced to accept a
NATO command. According to Illtellectual Capita, the Russian Supreme Commander,
President Boris Yeltsin, planned this maneuver in the utmost secrecy. NATO generals
were not the only ones taken by surprise when the Russian paratroopers arrived; it was
only after receiving presidential approval that the Chief of Russian General Staff,
Anatoliy Kvashnin, informed his boss, Russian Defense Minister, Sergheev. Neither
Prime-Minister Sergheev, nor Chief Intelligence Officer Vladimir Putin knew about the
paratrooper launch. l77 Another Russian strategic ploy was the use of Pristina Airport for a
large deployment of Russian troops. This plan was proven futile when Hungary,
Romania, and Bulgaria refused to open their air space to Russian military planes.
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in that a promise of a decline in the long-standing unconditional Russian support for FRY
unification,

MULTILATERAL IMPLICATIONS OF MONTENEGRIN INDEPENDENCE
"A unilateral declaration of independence by Montenegro will bring civil war", is
a popular claim by those in the Balkans, Milosevic would be happy to open a new
offensive to extend his "legitimization" as the defender of the Yugoslavian motherland in
defiance of "American imperialism", Many Montenegrins who do not want
independence, pledging allegiance to Greater Serbia, will support him, The community of
Serbian refugees from Kosovo and Bosnia, some 32,OOO-strong in Montenegro, will also
oppose secession, Finally, most East Europeans simply do not believe that anyone can
defeat the Yugoslav army, always loyal to Milosevic, on the ground in the Balkans,
Montenegrins have never taken up arms against the Serbs, In numerous
conversations, they made this point to Octavian Sofransky during his visit to the region,
"Going ahead with the referendum on independence for Montenegro would risk
radicalizing a popUlation still peacefully divided over the issue, and would offer
maximum provocation to Belgrade, which retains a powerful military presence in
Montenegro", 181 An armed struggle would highlight the status of hundreds of thousands
of Montenegrins living in Serbia, Unlike Kosovo, where Albanians had a large majority,
which increased after the Serbs fled, or Bosnia-Herzegovina, where Serbs have obtained
a territorial autonomy, Montenegro has no other division, than political, between the
nationalist Greens and unionist Whites,
During his visit to Montenegro in July, Sofransky observed that there was a very
complex mosaic of allegiances, a multi-layered political process, and a grotesque
historical heritage that render the apparent Green and White palette extremely nuance,
Montenegrin society is a duality; there are two parallel currencies-the Yugoslav Dinar
and the German D-Mark; two churches-the Serbian Patriarchate and the Montenegrin
one, even two capitals-the capital city Cetinje and the main city Podgorica, Some
people claim they speak Serbian, some affirm that they speak Montenegrin, some use the
Latin, some the Cyrillic alphabet. Almost half want an independent Montenegro while the
other half prefers a common state with the Serbians, However, there is no one clear
boundary within the Montenegrin society, since these predilections overlap and extend
well beyond Montenegro into neighboring Serbia where the business class uses the Latin
alphabet and the D-mark as well. Montenegrins have conformed to duality and prefer to
live with it rather taking one final decision,
A negotiated settlement, leading to a non-violent independence for Montenegro
implies an agreement from Belgrade, Prospects for this look grim, however, as long as
this independence is perceived in Belgrade mainly as an anti-Serbian conspiracy of the
West. Since the political and economic pressure applied on Belgrade did not function
before, in case of non-Serbian territories like Bosnia or Kosovo, it is even less probable
than they might function today in Montenegro-"a symbol of Serbian civilization,"
Montenegro and Serbia are in de facto confederation relations and are learning to accept a
parallel existence, What could not be done during the violent collapse of Yugoslavia,
namely a "velvet divorce," may be the ultimate result.
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Montenegrins, however, do not think in purely strategic terms but tend to focus on a
much more important, if disruptive, concept: their honor. With that as the focus for so
many, the prospects for peace in the Balkans wiJl remain clouded in the uncertainty uf a
potentiaJly violent post-communist nationalism.
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